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COMMENTARY
The Death Penalty Revisited
by ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG*
"Any man's Death diminishes Me" - John Donne
The number of persons sentenced to death boggles the mind. Two
thousand one hundred fifty-one currently are on death row,' and their
number increases almost daily. Moreover, in recent decisions the
Supreme Court has sanctioned a rush to execution, brushing aside legal
barriers.' The incontrovertible fact, however, is that there is no reason-
able case for the death penalty.
The death penalty does not serve the permissible objectives of crimi-
nal punishment: it neither deters nor rehabilitates,3 and it punishes the
least recidivist of all major crimes.
Capital punishment is nothing less than retaliation by society for the
horrible crime of murder. It is a repugnant application of the archaic
doctrine of lex talionis-an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. Retalia-
tion or retribution, however, is neither a permissible nor effective objec-
tive of criminal punishment.
In addition, the death penalty tends to sweep under the rug the
known causes of murder and other capital offenses: drug addiction, lack
of gun control, family disputes fueled by alcohol and pent-up grievances,
and mental illness. Furthermore, there is the ever-present danger that
innocents may be unjustly convicted and sentenced to death.4
The death penalty is also demonstrably disproportionately imposed
* Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1962-1965.
1. N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1988, at B2, col. 1.
2. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 108 S. Ct. 546 (1988); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987);
California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
3. See, eg., Lempert, The Effect of Executions on Homicides: A New Look in an Old
Light, 29 CRIME & DELINQ. 88 (1983); Baldus & Cole, A Comparison of the Work of Thorston
Sellin and Isaac Ehrlich on the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 170
(1975); see also H. BEDAU, DEATH IS DIFFERENT 33-44 (1987).
4. See Bedau and Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN.
L. REV. 21 (1987).
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on minorities.5 As proof, a recent research study establishes that over a
period of several years in South Carolina the death penalty was requested
by the prosecution in 49% of the cases of capital murder in which a black
killed a white but in only 11% of the cases in which a black killed a
black.6 This disparity in prosecutorial recommendation for sentencing is
racial. There is no other explanation.
Further, the death penalty is uniformly imposed only-on the poor,7
and the poor, unfortunately, are largely black and hispanic. Rich or es-
tablishment people also commit murder, but to my knowledge, no such
persons wait in death cells. This disparity makes a mockery of the con-
cept of Equal Justice for All, emblazoned on the edifice of the Supreme
Court of the United States.
Virtually all of our Western NATO allies and many other countries
have abolished the death penalty.8 Are we, alone, to be an outcast in the
society of civilized nations? In a speech to the House of Commons on
July 20, 1910, Sir Winston Churchill, then Home Secretary, said:
The mood and temper of the public in regard to the treatment of
crime and criminals is one of the most unfailing tests of the civilisa-
tion of any country. A calm and dispassionate recognition of the
rights of the accused against the State, and even of convicted
criminals against the State, a constant heart-searching by all
charged with the duty of punishment, a desire and eagerness to
rehabilitate in the world of industry all those who have paid their
dues in the hard coinage of punishment, tireless efforts towards the
discovery of curative and regenerating processes, and an unfalter-
ing faith that there is a treasure, if you can only find it, in the heart
of every man - these are the symbols which in the treatment of
crime and criminals mark and measure the stored-up strength of a
nation, and are the sign and proof of the living virtue in it.9
These humanitarian words and sentiments about the treatment of crime
and criminals, in my view, apply to all who seriously transgress the
law-common criminals as well as capital ones.
5. S. NATHANSON, AN EYE FOR AN EYE?: THE MORALITY OF PUNISHING BY DEATH
54-58 (1987); W. S. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE EIGHTIES 113-39 (1987); W. Bow-
ers and G. Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26
CRIME & DELINQ. 563 (1980).
6. Wall St. J., May 9, 1988, at 22, col. 4 (referring to a study by Raymond Paternoster,
published in J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (Fall 1983)).
7. See generally BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PRO-
FILE OF JAIL INMATES (1980).
8. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE DEATH PENALTY
app. 12 (1987).
9. HANSARD, xix, 1354 (20 July, 1910); 2 R. JAMES, WINSTON S. CHURCHILL: HIS
COMPLETE SPEECHES 1897-1963, at 1598 (1970).
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During my tenure on the Supreme Court, it was my opinion that the
death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment's proscription against
cruel and unusual punishment." A majority of my colleagues did not
agree." Nor does a majority of the present Court.12  I disagree
respectfully.
I remain convinced, however, that whatever may be said of times
past, the world-wide trend toward abolition of the death penalty estab-
lishes that such inhumane punishment transgresses "the evolving stan-
dards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."' 3 This
concept of punishment, in my view, outlaws the death penalty, since the
deliberate institutional taking of life by the state certainly offends evolv-
ing standards of decency.
The Supreme Court, as I have noted, does not now agree that capital
punishment is unconstitutional.' 4 As Justice McKenna aptly remarked,
however, in the landmark case of Weems v. United States,'" "Time
works changes ... ." Indeed it does.
I am convinced that the Supreme Court cannot much longer con-
tinue to ignore the uncivilized nature of its present holdings. Ultimately
the Supreme Court cannot long disregard the fact that the execution of
the more than 2,000 persons--or a considerable number of them-now
waiting in death cells would be nothing less than masg murder by
government.
We proudly and justifiably proclaim, that we are a decent society.
We must, therefore, always be alert to continue to act like one. As
10. Rudolph v. Alabama, 275 Ala. 115, 152 So. 2d 662, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 889 (1963)
(Goldberg, J., dissenting on the ground that the death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment
within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment when there is no taking of human life); see
Goldberg, J., Memorandum to the Conference Re: Capital Punishment, 1963, reprinted in 27
S. TEX. L. REv. 493 (1986).
11. During the 1963 Term the Court proceeded to deny certiorari in the six capital cases
before it. Snider v. Cunningham, 292 F.2d 683 (4th Cir. 1961), cert denied, 375 U.S. 889
(1963) (rape of a minor); Rudolph v. Alabama, 275 Ala. 115, 152 So. 2d 662, cert. denied, 375
U.S. 889, reh'g denied, 375 U.S. 917 (1963) (rape); Walker v. Nevada, 78 Nev. 463. 376 P.2d
137 (1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 882 (1963) (felony murder); Arnold v. North Carolina, 258
N.C. 563, 129 S.E. 2d 229, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 878, rev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S. 773
(1963) (murder); Smith v. Bomar, 212 Tenn. 149, 368 S.W. 2d 748, cert. denied, 376 U.S. 915
(1963) (felony murder); White v. Washington, 60 Wash. 2d 551, 374 P.2d 942 (1962), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 883 (1963) (murder).
12. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
13. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1957) (opinion of Warren, C.J., joined by Justices
Black, Douglas, and Whittaker).
14. See supra notes 2, 12. See also B. NAKELL AND K. HARDY, THE ARBITRARINESS OF
THE DEATH PENALTY, 37-58 (1987).
15. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
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